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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals of Utah has appellate jurisdiction over cases
transferred to the Court of Appeals form the Supreme Court, Utah Code 7 8-2a3(2)Q(2002 & Supp. 2007). The Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah
Court of Appeals on January 30, 2007. (Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R.") 1513
-1515; 1527).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs5 claims against
Appellees,

Dennis

Bench,

Brent

Bodily,

Adam

Christofferson,

Craig

Christofferson, Robert Eames, Devin Ellis, Mickey Ellis, Jerry Fulmer, Jimmie
Germer, Dale Hammon, Scott Hammon, Mike Howell, Brent Keyes, Ray Page,
Don Palfreyman, Dave Squires, Greg Warg, Robert "Mac" White, Bruce Woolsey,
Ryan Woolsey, BJ. Burkdoll, Jim Burkdoll, Gary McDaniel, Jim Vowles, John
Elwess, Bill New and Scott New (hereinafter "Stags Car Club members"), pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by finding that Plaintiffs did not state a claim upon
which relief could have been granted because Plaintiffs failed to plead that the
Stags Car Club members acted in furtherance of the tort that harmed
PlaintiffAjppellant, Sharon Williams?
Standard of Review: The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a
question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference. The
1

decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Development Co.
v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Anderson Development
Co., L.C. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,167, 116 P.3d 323, 341 (Utah 2005).
Citation to the Record: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and
arguing the same in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jim Burkdoll,
Devin Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, Jim
Vowles,

Jimmie

Germer,

Brent

Bodily,

Adam

Christofferson,

Craig

Christofferson, Jack Harris, Bruno Perry, Ryan Woolsey, and John Elwess'
Motions to Dismiss (R. 614 - 626) and November 1, 2006 Oral Argument (R.
1364).
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err in considering matters outside the
pleadings

in

determining

the

motion

to

dismiss

without

affording

Plaintiffs/Appellants a reasonable opportunity to discover and present all pertinent
material?
Standard of Review: The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a
question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference. The
decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Development Co.
v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Anderson Development
Co., L.C. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, \ 67, 116 P.3d 323, 341 (Utah 2005); Strand v.
Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977)(holding

2

that it is error to consider a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment,
without giving the adverse party an opportunity to present pertinent material).
Citation to the Record: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and
arguing the same in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jim Burkdoll,
Devin Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, Jim
Vowles,

Jimmie

Germer,

Brent

Bodily,

Adam

Christofferson,

Craig

Christofferson, Jack Harris, Bruno Perry, Ryan Woolsey, and John Elwess'
Motions to Dismiss (R. 614 - 626) and November 1, 2006 Oral Argument (R.
1364).
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the trial court err in dismissing the complaint with
prejudice and denying Appellants leave to amend the complaint?
Standard of Review: The applicable standard of review is abuse of
discretion. Neztsosie v. Meyer, 833 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 1994); Holmes Dev., LLC
v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, f 56, 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002).
Citation to the Record: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and
arguing the same in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jim Burkdoll,
Devin Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, Jim
Vowles,

Jimmie

Germer,

Brent

Bodily,

Adam

Christofferson,

Craig

Christofferson, Jack Harris, Bruno Perry, Ryan Woolsey, and John Elwess'

3

Motions to Dismiss (R. 614 - 626) and November 1, 2006 Oral Argument (R.
1364).
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the trial court err in certifying its Order of dismissal as a
final judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) without making any findings of
fact supporting the court's decision?
Standard of Review: The propriety of a Rule 54(b) certification is a
question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference. The
decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State
Tax Com'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991), citing Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.,
692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984).
Citation to the Record: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and
arguing the same in Plaintiffs' letter to the court with accompanying proposed
order (R. 1365), Notice of Objection to Defendants Rule 54(b) Motion for Final
Judgment (R. 1407 - 1410), and Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to Defendants
Proposed Findings and Rationale for Certifying Order Dismissing Individual
Defendants as Final per Rule 54(b). (R. 1489 - 1492).

4

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND RULES
The following rules and statutes interpretation are determinative or are of
central importance of the appeal:
Exhibit 1: Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
Exhibit 2: UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 48-1-10
Exhibit 3: UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 48-1-12
Exhibit 4: Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Exhibit 5: Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Exhibit 6: Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Exhibit 7: Excerpts of Transcript of Motion to Dismiss November 1, 2006 (R.
1364, pp. 27, 33, 34, 35).
Exhibit 8: Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Final Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 54(b).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:

The Appellants, ShaRon and Lynn Williams,

brought a personal injury lawsuit against Ralph Wiggins, Stags Car Club, and
Stags Car Club's individual members, arising from severe personal injuries
suffered by ShaRon Williams when she was struck by a truck driven by Ralph
Wiggins when she was a guest at an event conducted by the Stags Car Club. (R.
001 - 010; 090 - 099). The Williams' alleged negligence by all defendants and

5

vicarious liability against Stags Car Club and its individual members. (R. 001 010; 090-099).
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW:

The Williams' filed

their Complaint and Jury Demand against Stags Car Club, a Voluntary
Unincorporated Association; Ralph Wiggins; and John Does 1-100 on January 17,
2006. (R. 001-010). In response, Ralph Wiggins and Stags Car Club answered
the Complaint on February 15, 2006 and February 22, 2007, respectively. (R. 023
- 0 2 8 ; 029-037).
On May 4, 2007, the Williams' filed an Amended Complaint naming
individual members of the Stags Car Club. (R. 090 - 099). In response, on July
12, 2006, Defendants Jim Burkdoll, Devin Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel,
Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, and Jim Vowles filed a Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter
"Defendants' Jim Burkdoll, et al, Motion to Dismiss"). (R. 334 - 336). On July
14, 2006, Defendant Jimmie Germer filed a joinder in Defendants' Jim Burkdoll, et
al., Motion to Dismiss. (R. 390 - 392). On July 18, 2006, Defendants Adam
Christofferson, Craig Christofferson, Jack Harris, Bruno Perry, Ryan Woolsey, and
John Elwess filed a Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum incorporating
by reference "the same factual recitations and legal arguments submitted in the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Defendants Jim Burkdoll, Devin
Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, and Jim

6

Vowles (dated July 11, 2006)." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Defendants Adam Christofferson, Craig Christofferson, Jack Harris, Bruno Perry,
Ryan Woolsey, and John Elwess. (R. 409 - 411; 412 - 414). Also on July 18,
2006, Defendant Brent G. Bodily filed his joinder to the motion to dismiss. (R. 415
-418).
On August 1, 2006, the Williams' filed a memorandum in opposition to the
motions to dismiss and joinders thereto. (R. 614 - 626). The Williams' opposition
was followed by the individual members of Stags Car Club's reply memoranda and
additional joinders to the motion. (R. 651 - 658; 701 - 703; 704 - 713; 724 - 726;
727 - 741; 747 - 750; 751 - 755; 805 - 807). On November 1, 2006, the Court, the
Honorable Ernest W. Jones presiding, heard oral arguments and issued an order
granting the individual Stags Car Club's members motion to dismiss with prejudice
and denied Appellant's request for leave to amend. (R. 1364).
In response to Stags Car Club members' presented proposed order that
included not only a grant of the motion to dismiss with prejudice but also
certifying the order under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), Appellants, on
November 20, 2006, noted their objections to the certification and offered their
own proposed order excluding the 54(b) certification language. (R. 1365). In
response, on November 28, 2006, individual Stags Car Club members, Greg Warg
and B.J. Burkdoll filed a Rule 54(b) Motion for Final Judgment requesting the

7

certification of the dismissal order. (R. 848 - 850). On November 30, 2006, the
Court signed the Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Final
Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) and filed the same on December 6, 2006. (R.
1366-1370).
On December 14, 2007, the Williams filed Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to
Defendants' Rule 54(b) Motion for Final Judgment on the grounds that
certification had not been requested by the individual Stags Car Club members at
the time the Court issued the order and that it had not been properly briefed or
argued. (R. 1407 - 1410). Additionally, the Williams' objected to the motion as
moot since the Court had previously entered its Order Granting Defendants Motion
to Dismiss and Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) on November 30, 2006. (R.
1407 - 1410). Thereafter, additional joinders to the Rule 54(b) Motion for Final
Judgment, reply memoranda, and a [Proposed] Findings and Rationale for
Certifying Order Dismissing Individual Defendants as Final Per Rule 54(b) were
filed with the Court. (R. 1411 - 1414; 1438 - 1459).
Again, on December 21, 2006, the Williams' stated their objections to the
Rule 54(b) certification and further objected to the [Proposed] Findings and
Rational for Certifying Order Dismissing Individual Defendants as Final per Rule
54(b). (R. 1489 - 1492). On January 17, 2007, the Court entered the Stags Car
Club's members proposed Findings and Rationale for Certifying Order Dismissing

8

Individual Defendants as Final per Rule 54(b)—more than forty-five days after the
November 30, 2006 dismissal order and nineteen days after the Williams' filed
their Notice of Appeal (R. 8 7 8 - 881; 1521 - 1526).
STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On September 12, 2004, Stags Car Club—an

unincorporated association—and its members conducted, managed, and oversaw a
club-sponsored "steak fry" event at George Whalen Park, Roy City, Utah. (R. 090
- 099, THf 2, 4, 7, 13, 27). The "steak fry" event was conducted "[f]or entertaining
club members and their invitees." (R. 092, f 7). ShaRon Williams "[w]as an
invitee" at the "steak fry" event. (R. 092, f 9).
Shortly after arriving to the park with her husband Lynn Williams, ShaRon
Williams lay down on the grass between two trees and fell asleep. (R. 092 Ifll 8 10). Ralph S. Wiggins, who was then a member and the elected Secretary of Stags
Car Club, got in his pick-up truck to go get beverages for club members, and ran
over Ms. Williams as she lay sleeping in the grass. (R. 092 - 096,fflf11 - 12; 22 24). When Mr. Wiggins ran over Ms. Williams, he was "[a]cting within the course
and scope of his duties" and for "[t]he purpose of serving the Stags Car Club
interest" as a Stags Car Club member, officer, and nominee performing duties of
the general kind within the scope of Stags Car Club's activities, "[including
without limitation arranging, making provisions for, and conducting the event. . .
." (R. 092 - 096,ffif11 - 12, 22 - 24). Mr. Wiggins ran over Ms. Williams on his

9

way to get a cooler for use and benefit by the Stags Car Club and its members in
conducting the event." (R. 092 - 093,1ffl 11 - 12).
On May 4, 2006, Appellants' named the individual members of the Stags
Car Club
As a result of all named Defendants' negligence, including Mr. Wiggins
running her over as she lay on the grass and the Stags Car Club's members failure
to exercise a reasonable lookout and reasonable care for persons present at and
participating in the event in which they conducted, managed, and oversaw, Ms.
Williams suffered permanent and disabling injuries and other damages. (R. 090 099, Iffl 13-30).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court erred when it granted the Stags Car Club's members
Motion to Dismiss with prejudice because the Williams' complaint did, as a matter
of law, state claims upon which relief could have been granted. As members of an
unincorporated association, the Stags Car Club members are directly liable for
their own negligence in conducting, managing, and overseeing an unsafe event and
they are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the fellow members of their
unincorporated association.
Additionally, any order should have been entered without prejudice and the
Williams' should have been granted leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15, Utah

10

Rule of Civil Procedure; as justice requires the Williams' be permitted the
opportunity to sufficiently set forth allegations that, if proven, allow recovery
against individual members of an unincorporated association. Moreover, the
district court erred when it certified the dismissal under Rule 54(b) without making
the necessary and proper findings and rationale prior to certifying the order as
required under Utah law.
ARGUMENT
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
should only be affirmed if it appears to a certainty that Plaintiffs would not be
entitled to relief under any state offacts, which could be proved in support of its
claims. Educators Mutual Insurance Association v. Allied Property and Casualty
Insurance Company, 890 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1995)(quoting Prows v. State, 822
P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991) and Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669
(Utah 1989)(emphasis added). Accepting all of Appellants' allegations as admitted
facts and drawing all inferences of those facts in the light favorable to them, the
Williams9 have stated claims for relief against Stags Car Club's members. Medved
v. Glenn, 2005 UT 77, If 8, 125 P.3d 913, 915 (Utah 2005), quoting Riddle v.
Perry, 2002 UT 10, f 2, 40 P.3d 1128, 1130 - 1131 (Utah 2002); Anderson
Development Co., L.C., 2005 UT 36, t 53, 116 P.3d 323, 338 (Utah 2005), quoting
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co,, 2002 UT 69, f 38, 54 P. 3d 1054, 1065
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(Utah 2002)("In reviewing a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss .
. . 'we accept the factual allegations in the [complaint] as true and consider them,
and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party.'").
L

SHARON AND LYNN WILLIAMS STATED CLAIMS UPON
WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED AGAINST THE
INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE STAGS CAR CLUB.
On November 30, 2006, the Trial Court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissed with prejudice claims of direct and vicarious
liability against the "defendants who are club members, except Ralph Wiggins" on
the grounds that the Williams' "failed to plead that these members acted in
furtherance of the tort which harmed plaintiff." (R. 1366 - 1370). Dismissal by the
District Court was error.
As an unincorporated association, Stags Car Club and its members are duty
bound to use the same care to avoid injury to others as are individual, natural
persons. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d)(2007); Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527,
534 (Me. 1973). Accordingly, under certain circumstances, the unincorporated
association and its members could be held directly and/or vicariously liable for the
torts committed against nonmembers. Id; Rudolph v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation,
898 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Guyton v. Howard, 525 So.2d 948, 957
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Libby, 311 A.2d at 534; Boehm v. Cody Chamber of

12

Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 708 (Wyo. 1987); Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d
1029, 1034 (Utah 1987); Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, n.l (Utah 1984).
The Complaint and Jury Demand and subsequent Amended Complaint
sufficiently alleged two distinct claims of direct and vicarious liability against
individual member defendants for their injuries. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) (stating that
the only requirements of a complaint are that it contain a "short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and "a demand for
judgment for the relief. . .."); (R. 001 - 010; 090 - 099).
a. APPELLANTS SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE
AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE STAGS CAR CLUB AS
PERSONS CONDUCTING, MANAGING, AND OVERSEEING THE CLUBSPONSORED EVENT.

To establish a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must establish (1) that the
defendant(s) owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached the duty, (3)
that the breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4)
that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries or damages. Interwest Const v. Palmer,
923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996). A duty of care arises when the defendant(s) is
under any obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff. Webb v. University of
Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 2005)(quoting Delbridge v. Maricopa County
Cmty. Coll

Dist,

893 P.2d 55, 58 (1994))(internal quotation omitted).

"Determining whether a party has an affirmative duty to protect another . . .
requires a careful consideration of the consequences for the parties and society at
13

large." Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986). The Utah
Supreme Court has "consistently taken 'a policy-based approach' in determining
whether a special relation should be said to exist and consequently whether a duty
is owed." Diysdale v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1, 3 (\994)(quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake
County, 855 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1993).
Utah precedent generally applies the "special relation" analysis afforded by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, applying a factor-based analysis to determine
whether there exists a duty. Diysdale, 869 P.2d at 3. Factors include: (1) "the
identity and character of the actor," (2) "the victim and the victimizer," (3) "the
relationship of the actor to the victim and the victimizer," and (4) "the practical
impact that finding a special relationship would have." Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237.
Appellants' have alleged, and, for purposes of this appeal, the Court must
accept as true, the allegations of the complaint, to-wit: ShaRon Williams' was an
invitee to the event sponsored and conducted by the Stags Car Club and its
members. (R. 092 - 096, ffif 7 - 9, 13, 27); Stags Car Club is and at all times
relevant to the complaint was "an unincorporated association doing business in the
State of the Utah"; and the event at issue was hosted, conducted, managed, and
overseen by Stags Car Club and its individual members. (R. 091 - 096, ^f 2, 7, 13,
27); that, "as members of Defendant Stags Car Club and as members conducting,
managing and overseeing" the event at which ShaRon Williams was injured, Stags
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Car Club members undertook the duty to organize and conduct the event in a
reasonably safe manner, "including . . . to exercise a reasonable lookout and
reasonable care for persons present at and participating in the event." (R. 096, f
27).
The Williams further alleged that Defendants, in obtaining possession of the
premises for the period during which the event was conducted, undertaking the
event at issue, and inviting the Williams' to participate, created a special
relationship and assumed a duty of reasonable care for the protection of their
invitees, including Ms. Williams, as persons present at and participating in the
event. (R. 092 - 096, f t 7, 9, 13, 27). Stags Car Club members breached their duty
of care in conducting, managing, and overseeing an unsafe event and by failing to
"observ[e] the movement of vehicles at the event and to warn persons of the
presence of moving motor vehicles." (R. 093 - 097, If 13, 19 - 20, 27 - 28).
Individual Stags Car Club members' active sponsorship and participation in
the event, including "conducting, managing, and overseeing" the event imposes
direct liability for such acts and omissions in breach of their duty. See Rudolph v.
Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation, 898 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that sponsors of an event owe a duty to use reasonable care in designing and
conducting their event to prevent others from being injured.). Guyton v. Howard,
525 So.2d 948, 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)(holding that members of an
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unincorporated association may be liable if found that he [or she] "committed or
participated in a tortious act or failure to act, or authorized, assented to or ratified
such an act or failure to act . . . or set in motion the proceedings or agreed to the
course of action which culminated in the foreseeable conduct which caused . . .
injuries [to a third party]); Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527, 534 (Me. 1973) (holding
liability attached to members of an unincorporated association who are shown to
have actively participated in the affair resulting in plaintiffs injuries).
Finally, Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the Defendants' negligent acts
and/or omissions, Plaintiffs have suffered damages including, but not limited to,
past medical expenses, lost wages and earning capacity, past general damages
including "pain, suffering, emotional distress and any loss of use amounting to a
permanent disability," and "for such other relief as is appropriate and proper under
the circumstances." (R 090 - 099). Because the purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish
the facts or resolve the merits of a case . . . [ , ] dismissal is justified only when the
allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a
claim." Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah
1996). Here, Appellants plead all of the elements of negligent misconduct under
Utah law.
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b. APPELLANTS HAVE STATED A CLAIM FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY
FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS O F OTHER MEMBERS OF STAGS CAR
CLUB, AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION.

The Williams alleged, as an alternative claim, that, by virtue of their status
as members and as recipients of the privileges and benefits of membership of the
unincorporated association, the individual member Defendants are vicariously
liable for the negligent acts of other members of the unincorporated association
and for the injuries and damages that result therefrom. (R. 091 - 099). These
allegations are sufficient to survive the Stags Car Club members' Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.
The precise question of whether members of an unincorporated association
are liable for the negligent acts of other members has not been directly addressed
by Utah courts. However, other jurisdictions have addressed this issue and found
that vicarious liability attaches.
Unincorporated associations that have operations related directly to the
interests of the membership, and has members actively involved in its operation
and management, resemble a partnership and are thus subject to the same rules
applicable to partnerships. City of Kalamazoo v. Michigan Disposal Serv. Corp.,
125 F.Supp.2d 219, 236 (W.D. Mich. 2000); Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks Local 291 v. Mooney, 666 N.E.2d 970 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). This general
rule rests on the theory that unincorporated associations are joint enterprises or
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joint ventures and therefore members of the unincorporated association stand in the
same relationship as partners in a general partnership. Boehm v. Cody Chamber of
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 708 (Wyo. 1987) (holding an unincorporated association
is a joint enterprise and is subject to the same rules as a partnership therefore
negligence of one member, acting in furtherance of the enterprise, is imputable to
all); Rogers v. MO. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1987) (joint venturers
stand in the same relationship as partners, and thus principles governing liability of
one partner act for the benefit of partnership); Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, n.l
(Utah 1984)(a joint venture is subject to the same rules as a partnership.); U.C.A. §
48-1-3.1 (1985). Under Utah Code Annotated Section 48-1-10:
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the
ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority
of his copartners loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a
partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is
liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting
to act.
U.C.A. § 48-1-10 (1953, as amended 2007). Partners are jointly and severally
liable "for everything chargeable to the partnership under Sections 48-1-10 and 481-11." U.C.A. § 48-1-12 (1953, as amended 2007).
Additionally, members of an unincorporated association may be held liable
for torts committed by other members without personal participation in the
wrongful act, if the members set the proceedings in motion or agree to a course of
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action that culminates in the wrongful conduct. Guyton v. Howard, 525 So. 2d 948
(Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1st Dist. 1988).
Appellants have alleged that Stags Car Club was and continues to be "[a]n
unincorporated association doing business in the State of Utah, with its principal
place of business in Roy, Utah." (R. 091, ^f 2). In addition, Appellants allege that
at the time of the events giving rise to this action, Ralph Wiggins, a member and
officer of Defendant Stags Car Club, was acting within the course and scope of his
duties as a member and officer of the unincorporated association and that "his
conduct was motivated, in whole or in part, by the purpose of serving" the interests
of the unincorporated association. (R. 091 - 098, ffif 3, 11, 22 - 24, 30).
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have alleged that members of the club "nominated and
designated Ralph S. Wiggins to perform duties of the general kind and nature
performed in the scope of Defendant Stags Car Club's activities," including
arranging, making provisions for, and conducting the event. (R. 095 - 096, <(fl| 2324, 26).
Therefore, accepting as true the allegations in Appellants' complaint, as
members of the unincorporated association, each member may be jointly and
severally liable for the wrongful acts of other members acting within authority of
other co-members or within the ordinary course of the business of Stags Car Club.
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U.C.A. §§ 48-1-10, 48-1-12 (2006). Clearly, Appellants properly plead a
cognizable claim of vicarious liability.
As here, where an unincorporated association exercises the rights and
powers of a legal entity, it should, to the extent reasonably and legally possible, be
held to assume corresponding duties and obligations, including member liability.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING MATTERS
OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS IN DETERMINING THE MOTION
TO DISMISS WITHOUT AFFORDING APPELLANTS A
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCOVER AND PRESENT
ALL PERTINENT MATERIAL.

The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to challenge the formal sufficiency of
the claim for relief, not to establish facts or resolve the merits of the case. Whipple
v. American for Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1990)(emphasis added).
In considering a motion to dismiss the trial courts role "[was to] review only the
material allegations in [Plaintiffs'] complaint, and not the evidence submitted
outside of the pleadings." Ho v. Jim's Enters, Inc., 29 P.3d 633, 635 n.5 (Utah
2001). However, the trial court did not solely focus the material allegations of the
amended complaint to decide the individual members motion to dismiss, but made
specific findings of fact, without affording Appellants a reasonable opportunity to
present all pertinent material as requested or having the benefit of foil discovery, to
justify its outcome. (R. 1364, at pp. 33 - 35).
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Specifically, as to direct negligence the Court found, "the only person who
was really actively involved in committing this tort which is backing over or
running over . .. [Plaintiff] [was] Mr. Wiggins." (R. 1364, pp. 33: 19 - 24, 34: 16 18). The Court further found that defendants were not possessors of land, Ms.
Williams was not an invitee, but a mere licensee, and that the Court "just [doesn't]
find that the defendants, these car club members were ever acting in furtherance of
the tort." (R. 1364, p. 34: 10 - 24). Moreover, without the benefit of discovery or
affording Appellants the opportunity to present pertinent material, the Court simply
found that members must "[b]e doing something that led to the injury of Ms.
Williams, and just belonging to the car club and just paying dues and just bringing
your steak or potluck or whatever, . . . [is not] enough to impose any kind of
liability." (R. 1364, p. 35: 7 - 13).
The trial court further justified dismissal of Plaintiffs vicarious liability
claims because "it appears to [the Court] that the Skags [sic] Car Club is an
unincorporated nonprofit social club" and therefore because of its non-profit
nature, the "individual club members . . . cannot be held liable for the negligence
of a club member, Mr. Wiggins, simply by virtue of their status as members of the
club." (R. 1364, p. 33: 19 - 34: 9)(emphasis added). The trial court found that
Stags Car Club was non-profit because it saw "no indication the club was acting
for pecuniary gain in this particular case based on what he saw in the briefs."
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"[T]he briefs" as commented on by the Court presumably included an affidavit and
other evidence submitted in Defendant Jimmie Germer's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (dated June 16,
2006)(R. 114-128), Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Jimmie
Germer's Motion for Summary Judgment (dated July 6, 2006)(R. 281 - 3 1 9 ) , and
subsequent Reply Memorandum (dated July 10, 2006)(R. 324 - 330).
For the purposes of this appeal, it is important to note that the Complaint and
Amended Complaint state that the Stags Car Club is an unincorporated association,
it makes no designation or pleading of fact that the Stags Car Club is a "nonprofit
social club."

(R. 091, f 2). Neither does the Complaint solely allege individual

member liability merely upon membership of a "social club." (R. 090 - 099).
Rather, and more accurately, the Complaint alleges two separate and distinct
claims of direct and vicarious liability. Specifically that Stags Car Club is and at all
times relevant to the complaint was "an unincorporated association doing business
in the State of the Utah" and that the event at issue was hosted, conducted,
managed, and overseen by Stags Car Club and its individual members. (R. 091 —
096 , ffif 2, 7, 13, 27). That "as members of Defendant Stags Car Club and as
members conducting, managing and overseeing" the event at which ShaRon
Williams was injured, Stags Car Club members undertook the duty to organize and
conduct the event in a reasonably safe manner, "including . . . to exercise a
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reasonable lookout and reasonable care for persons present at and participating in
the event." (R. 096,ffi[26 - 27).
Additionally and alternatively, the Appellants further alleged that at the time
of the events giving rise to this action, Ralph Wiggins, a member and officer of
Defendant Stags Car Club, was acting within the course and scope of his duties as
a member and officer of the unincorporated association and that "his conduct was
motivated, in whole or in part, by the purpose of serving" the interests of the
unincorporated association and its members; that members of the club "nominated
and designated Ralph S. Wiggins to perform duties of the general kind and nature
performed in the scope of Defendant Stags Car Club's activities," including
arranging, making provisions for, and conducting the event; and "[b]y virtue of
their status as members of the unincorporated association, Defendant Stags Car
Club, and as recipients of the privileges and benefits of membership of Defendant
Stags Car Club, including without limitation the specific even described above, . . .
are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of other members of the unincorporated
association and for the injuries and damages that result there from. (R. 095 - 096,
1H 23-24, 30).
When affidavits or other evidence are presented in support of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted—as in the
instant case— and the court does not exclude them, the motion is converted into a
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motion for summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 56. Once
the trial court considered materials outside the pleadings, all parties must be given
adequate notice and opportunity to submit supporting materials. Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(emphasis added).
Appellants specifically requested the Court to provide such notice and allow
an opportunity to conduct further discovery so they may adequately and justly
present supporting materials for their allegations. (R. 614 - 626). However, the
Court failed to allow Appellants this opportunity and rejected their specific request
to do so pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 614 - 626). The
action of the District Court in denying the Williams' notice and the reasonable
opportunity to present controverting material violated the mandate of Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 561
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977)(holding that it is error to consider a motion to dismiss
as a motion for summary judgment, without giving the adverse party an
opportunity to present pertinent material).
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING APPELLANTS
AN OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT.

If the Complaint was deficient—which the Appellants do not believe or
concede—the Williams' should have been provided the opportunity to amend the
Complaint to adequately plead that the individual members acted in furtherance of
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the tort that harmed Ms. Williams. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 15, in pertinent part, states:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it any time within 20
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only
be leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave
shall be freely when justice so requires.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a).
In the instant matter, Stags Car Club members9 motions to dismiss are not
responsive pleadings that would preclude the Williams' from exercising their right
to amend the complaint "once as a matter of course." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a);
Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, 110 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Moreover, it is a general rule in Utah that dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) is not final or on the merits and the court normally will give
plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Alvarez v. Galetcka, 933 P.2d 987,
991 (Utah 1997). Indeed, the only occasion where a trial court should usurp a
Plaintiffs request to amend afforded by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) is
when "[i]t appears to a certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim." Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
As stated above, liability of the individual Stags Car Club members is
predicated upon both their direct liability as individuals conducting, managing, and
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overseeing the event and vicarious liability as members of an unincorporated
association. (R. 090 - 099). The individual members only challenge to the
sufficiency of the Williams' complaint is the alleged absence of specific acts by the
members that were in furtherance of Ms. Williams being run over while attending
their member-sponsored, member-conducted, and member-managed event.
The individual members position, however, only furthers the Williams'
contention that the causes of actions as plead by the Williams' are proper and that
the only fault, if any, was presenting the allegation that the members in negligently
organizing, conducting, and maintaining an unsafe event including maintaining a
reasonable lookout and reasonable care for persons present at and participating in
the event furthered or contributed to Mr. Wiggins running over Ms. Williams as
she lay sleeping in the grass between the trees. (R. 1366 - 1370). Accordingly,
Appellants' should have been afforded the opportunity to file a motion to amend
the Complaint as requested. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a); (R. 614 - 626; 1364 at p. 27).
The District Court erred when it dismissed with prejudice Appellants' direct
and vicarious liability claims against the individual members of the Stags Car
Club. Educators Mutual Insurance Association v. Allied Property and Casualty
Insurance Company, 890 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah \995)(quotingProws v. State, 822
P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991) and Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669
(Utah 1989). The appropriate remedy for a Rule 12(b)(6) violation is dismissal
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without prejudice with leave to file a proper motion to amend or leave to amend.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a); Alvarez v. Galetcka, 933 P.2d at 991.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CERTIFYING THE
DISMISSAL AS A FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER UTAH R. CIV. P.
54(B).

The district court erred when it certified the dismissal as final under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) without making the necessary and proper findings
under Utah law. (R. 1366 - 1370). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) states in
pertinent part:
Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether
as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, and/or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Utah law interpreting Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) states that three (3)
requirements must be satisfied prior to the entry of final judgment: (1) "[t]here
must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the action"; (2) [t]he
judgment appealed from must have been entered on an order that would be
appealable but for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the action"; and (3)
"[t]he trial court, in its discretion, must make a determination that 'there is no just
reason for delay' of the appeal." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 814
27

P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991) quoting 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civ. 2d § 2656, at 47 - 48 (1983).

Generally,

certification should be precluded where there is significant "factual overlap"
between the operative facts of the certified and unlitigated claims. Bennion v.
Pennzoil Company, 826 P.2d 137, 137 (Utah 1992).
Additionally, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that the trial court
"find the facts specially" in all actions by the court and in interlocutory orders.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Bennion, 826 P.2d at 139. Accordingly, to properly certify
an order under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) a simple incantation of the
words of certification is insufficient. Bennion, 826 P.2d at 139. The order must
contain findings supporting the conclusion that such orders are final and a rationale
explaining why there was no just reason for delay, including findings regarding the
lack of factual overlap between the certified and remaining claims. Bennion, 826
P.2datl39.
In the instant case, the district court failed to make a proper determination
and enumeration of findings or rationale. (R. 1366 - 1370). Although the District
Court signed a proposed order that included findings and rationale for Rule 54(b)
certification of the dismissal order, it was done only after the Order Granting
Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) was
entered, without affording the Williams' the opportunity to fully brief the matter
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when requested, and without proper jurisdiction. (R. 1365; 1366 - 1370; 1521 1526); U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2); Utah R. App. P. 3. Indeed, the [Proposed] Findings and
Rationale for Certifying Order Dismissing Individual Defendants as Final per Rule
54(b) was entered forty-eight days after the dismissal and certification order had
been signed and nineteen (19) days after the Notice of Appeal was filed. (R. 878 881; 1366-1370; 1521-1526).
Without making the proper determination, findings of fact, and rationale, the
district court erred when it certified the dismissal as final under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) under Utah law.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred when it granted the Stags Car Club's members
Motion to Dismiss with prejudice because the Williams9 pleadings stated claims
upon which relief could have been granted. As members of an unincorporated
association, the individual defendants are directly liable for their own negligence in
conducting, managing, and overseeing an unsafe event, and as members of the
unincorporated association they are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their
fellow member.
Additionally, the Stags Car Club's members should have been dismissed, if
at all, without prejudice and the Williams' should have been granted leave to
amend pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to sufficiently set forth the
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allegations, if proven, that allow recovery against individual members of an
unincorporated association. Moreover, the district court erred when it certified the
dismissal under Rule 54(b) without making the necessary and proper findings and
rationale prior to certifying the order as required under Utah law.
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C

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)

*

!

Part III,

Pleadings, Motions, and Orders

RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons
and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service of
the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days
after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the
answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by
the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a
motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the
time for responding to the remaining claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on
the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of
the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite
statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure
to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is
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waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a
motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that
the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be
required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite
statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the
order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or
within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to
which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join
with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes
a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections
then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not
thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted,
except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented
either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for
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judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver
of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may
be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of
the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a
$300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs
and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall,
upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
[Amended effective September 4, 1985;

April 1, 1990;

November 1, 2000.]

CROSS REFERENCES
Complaint, motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, see Rules Civ.
Proc., Form 10.
Insurance, additional time to answer, see § 31A-2-310.
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Parties
Pleading

^"^

77 to

w

78, 85, 150, 342, 351 to 361, 367.

Pretrial Procedure ^ W ~ ^ ~ 5 5 6 ^ 5 6 1 ^ 6 2 1 t o 6 2 9 .
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 302k78; 302k85; 302kl50; 302k342; 302k351 to
302k361; 302k367; 287k77 to 287k81; 307Ak556; 307Ak561; 307Ak621 to
307Ak629.
C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 142.
C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit §§ 52 to _53_, j^2, J54 to 66.
C.J.S. Parties §§ 197 to 211.
C.J.S. Pleading §§ 160 to IQ,
1_6_8 to 17_0, £04, 5>6_4 to 5_65, 5_9_4 to 6>_92, _694 to
695, 710 to 12A, 121_ to 762.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
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c

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 48. Partnership

*ra
Chapter 1. General and Limited Liability Partnerships (Refs & Annos)

—^™

Part 1.

General Partnership

§ 48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course
of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his copartners loss or
injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any
penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the
partner so acting or omitting to act.
Laws 1921, c. 89, § 13.
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 69-1-10;

C. 1943, § 69-1-10.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 13 of the Uniform Partnership Act (1914) . See Volume
6, Pt. I Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Partnership ^-^
153.
Westlaw Key Number Search:
C.J.S. Partnership § 168.

289kl53.
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RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
115 A.L.R. 1362, Constitutionality, Construction, and Application of Statutes Which
Forbid or Otherwise Regulate Compensation for Organizing Corporation, Procuring
Subscription for Stock, or Selling Its Securities.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 1.
Evidence of joint venture £
Fraud 3^
1_. In general
Joint venturers stand in same relationship to each other as partners, and thus
principles governing liability of one partner for fraudulent assignment of
partnership assets for benefit of partnership apply. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-10. Rogers
v. M.O. Bitner Co., 1987, 738 P.2d 1029.
Adventures

€^7

Joint Adventures

€==?
^**

1; Joint

2_. Evidence of joint venture
Real estate agentTs receipt of $2,000 from general contractor was a share of the
profits and was prima facie evidence that he was a joint venturer; owners
testified that agent told them he was general contractor's partner, had met with
them and general contractor several times and had gone beyond normally expected
real estate agent activities by assisting with ordering of materials for job site.
U.C.A.1953, 48-1-3.1, 48-1-10 to 48-1-12. Hoth v. White, 1990, 799 P.2d 213.
Joint Adventures

€=»,.„

3. Fraud
In derivative action by stockholder of life insurance company against directors,
who allegedly caused company to issue capital stock to themselves without company
receiving anything of value, to recover market value of stock, liability of
directors was joint and several, rather than several and not joint, where right of
recovery was based primarily on fraud of directors in acting both as directors and
members of partnership, which organized the company, and which received stock from
company, and which distributed stock to directors. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-10, 48-1-12.
Bergeson v. Life Ins Corp of America, 1958, 170 F.Supp. 150, affirmed in part,
reversed in part 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3
L.Ed.2d 1545. Insurance

Qz?
^-^

1151

U.C.A. 1953 § 48-1-10, UT ST § 48-1-10
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Current through 2007 First Special Session including laws passed at the
2007 November General election.
Copr © 2007 Thomson/West
END OF DOCUMENT
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c

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 48. Partnership

• • ^ M Chapter 1. General and Limited Liability Partnerships (Refs & Annos)

Part 1.

General Partnership

§ 48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), all partners are liable:
(a) jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under
Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11.
(b) jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership, except a
partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership contract.
(2)(a) A partner in a limited liability partnership is not liable, directly or
indirectly, including by way of indemnification, contribution or otherwise, for a
debt, obligation, or liability chargeable to the partnership arising from
negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct committed while the partnership is
registered as a limited liability partnership and in the course of the partnership
business by another partner, or an employee, agent, or representative of the
limited liability partnership.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a partner in a limited liability
partnership is liable for his own negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct.
Laws 1921, c. 89, § 15;

Laws 1994, c. 61, § 3.

Codifications R.S. 1933, § 69-1-12;

C. 1943, § 69-1-12.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
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Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 15 of the Uniform Partnership Act (1914) . See Volume
6, Pt. I Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Partnership ^ - ^
165.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 289kl65.
C.J.S. Partnership §§ 167 to 168.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
115 A.L.R. 1362, Constitutionality, Construction, and Application of Statutes Which
Forbid or Otherwise Regulate Compensation for Organizing Corporation, Procuring
Subscription for Stock, or Selling Its Securities.
Forms
19 Am. Jur. Pi. & Pr. Forms Partnership § 13, Statutory References.
Alabama Corporation Law with Forms § 1:20, The Limited Liability Partnership.
19 Am. Jur. Pi. 5 Pr. Forms Partnership § 13, Statutory References.
24 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 145, is the Limited Liability Partnership Now
the Entity of Choice for Delaware Law Firms?
Treatises and Practice Aids
BNA Health Law & Business Series No. 2200 § 2200.03, Formation of Joint Ventures.
Limited Liability Companies: Tax and Business Law 15.02, Registered Limited
Liability Partnerships.
SC7 6 American Law Institute-American Bar Association 1, Substantive Partnership
Law: Special Problems of General and Limited Partnerships.
SB85 American Law Institute-American Bar Association 1, Substantive Partnership
Law: Special Problems of General and Limited Partnerships.
CA86 American Law Institute-American Bar Association 1, Substantive Partnership
Law: Special Problems of General and Limited Partnerships.
937 Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 149,
Organization and Operation of the Limited Liability Company: Substantive Issues.
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937 Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 237,
Limited Liability Entities for Law Firms.
869 Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 355,
Organization and Operation of the Limited Liability Company.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Agency relationship J3
Assets of individual partners £
Award 18
Bankruptcy 11
Corporations J*
Derivative action _1
Dismissal 14
Evidence of joint ventures 16
Failure to comply with statutory requirements 10
Fiduciary nature of relationship 2
Individual liability 1_
Insurance companies £
Interest 1_9
Joint and several liability 5_
Laches L3
Parol evidence 15
Requirements of partnership £
Service 12^
Sufficiency of evidence 1/7
_1. Derivative action
In stockholder's derivative action, stockholder must maintain a claim not for
himself or any stockholder or any creditor but solely for the corporation. Bergeson
v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 19_

€^>

S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Corporations ^ - ^

202

In stockholder's derivative suit for benefit of corporation, evidence sustained
finding that requirements of rule governing secondary actions by stockholders were
satisfied. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 23(b), 28 U.S.C.A. Bergeson v. Life Insurance
Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360
U.S.

932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545.

Corporations ^ " ^

212

Even though corporation was damaged by acts and omissions of officers and alleged
promoters resulting in its authorization to act as stock life insurance corporation
without capital and surplus required by Utah law, whatever improprieties there may
have been did not result in legal injury to corporation and there could be no
recovery in stockholder's derivative suit for benefit of corporation on basis of
such improprieties. U.S.A.1953, 31-11-1. Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corporation of

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 4
UC.A 1953 §48-1-12

America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3
L.Ed.2d 1545.

Insurance ^ ^

1151

2_. Fiduciary nature of relationship
Man who was neither an officer nor a director of corporation at time of stock
issuance would not be held liable for balance due on stock on theory of liability
because of a breach of a fiduciary duty. Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corporation of
America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3

L.Ed.2d 1545.

€^>

Corporations ^ ^ ^

307

Corporate officers and directors have a fiduciary or quasi fiduciary relationship
to corporation requiring them to act loyally and m good faith without assuming any
position in conflict with interests of corporation and promoters must act fairly
and honestly in their dealings with corporation. Bergeson v. Life Insurance
Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360
U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Corporations ^ ^

30(2);

Corporations ^ - ^

307

3_. Corporations
A corporation necessarily acts vicariously and can acquire knowledge only through
its officers and agents and their knowledge is knowledge of corporation. Bergeson
v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 7_9
S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Corporations ^ ^

428(1)

_4. Requirements of partnership
On question whether profits shared should be regarded merely as wages, it is
important to consider degree to which a party participates m management of the
enterprise and whether the relationship is such that the party shares generally in
potential profits or advantages and thus should be held responsible for losses or
liability incurred therein. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-12. Cutler v. Bowen, 1975, 543 P.2d
1349.

Partnership

^ ^

9(1)

5_. Joint and several liability
In derivative action by stockholder of life insurance company against directors,
who allegedly caused company to issue capital stock to themselves without company
receiving anything of value, to recover market value of stock, liability of
directors was joint and several, rather than several and not joint, where right of
recovery was based primarily on fraud of directors in acting both as directors and
members of partnership, which organized the company, and which received stock from
company, and which distributed stock to directors. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-10, 48-1-12.
Bergeson v. Life Ins Corp of America, 1958, 170 F.Supp. 150, affirmed in part,
reversed in part 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3
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L.Ed.2d 1545.

Insurance ^ ^

1151

_6. Insurance companies
Where original contributions by partnership were noted in books of mutual insurance
corporation as contributed surplus on understanding that, at such time that mutual
corporation became a stock corporation, stock would be issued to partnership,
advances were not loans but were in effect stock subscriptions and acceptance of
benefit of advances carried with it obligation to issue stock therefore at such
time as the corporation was in position to take such action and to extent that
stock was issued with a market value not exceeding value of cash advanced and
equipment furnished it by partnership, it was paid for by the partnership.
Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari
denied 79 S. Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Insurance ^ - r r ^ ~

H60

2- Individual liability
Member of partnership may because of membership, be held individually liable for
partnership obligation incurred within scope of partnership business. Prows v.
Hawley, 1928, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31.

srship ^-^
^-^
Partnership

It
165

J3. Agency relationship
Where plaintiff, with full knowledge that partnership had been granted option to
buy realty, entered into agency agreement with one of the partners, whereby partner
agreed to negotiate for purchase of the same realty, that any instruments executed
should be executed in his individual name, and that he would assign all rights he
might acquire to his principal, and where the agency agreement made no mention of
the previous option, the agency agreement gave plaintiff no valid contractual right
to purchase the realty under the option agreement, and was not binding on
partnership. Cummings v. Jorgensen, 1971, 25 Utah 2d 274, 480 P.2d 466.
Partnership

€^ r
^-^

173

9_. Assets of individual partners
Partnership debts and obligations must be satisfied by partnership assets to extent
any exist before creditor can seek satisfaction from individual assets of
partnership. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-12(2). McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell Telephone,
1988, 758 P.2d 914.

Partnership

^^

187

10. Failure to comply with statutory requirements
Members of partnership which received benefit of stock issued to partnership were
liable under theory of quasi contract for partial failure of consideration paid by
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partnership for stock and in view of fact that partners had failed to comply with
Utah Limited Partnership Act, they were liable as general partners and were jointly
and severally liable therefor. U.S.A.1953, 48-1-12, 48-2-2. Bergeson v. Life
Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct.
1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Partnership > * X ~ ~

362

Utah law to effect that an insurer shall not pay to any person, who has power to
decide which insurance applications shall be accepted or rejected, any compensation
related to income upon such risks except upon net profits therefrom was violated by
agreement between insurer and partnership to pay partnership overriding commissions
on all insurance written where members of partnership were officers and directors
of insurer and had power to accept or reject risks and partnership was not entitled
to be issued stock of insurer in consideration for overriding commission on
insurance written by partnership. U.C.S.1953, 31-7-10. Bergeson v. Life Insurance
Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360
U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545.

Insurance

^-^

1151

11. Bankruptcy
For preference purposes, transfers from Chapter 11 debtor general partner to
debtor's partnerships to pay debt was for benefit of "creditor," where guarantor of
debts under Utah law had contingent right to payment against debtor general
partner. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(4) (A), (9) (A), 547 (b), (b) (1), 550 (a) (1);
U.C.A.1953, 48-1-12(2), 48-2-9. In re Granada, Inc., 1990, 115 B.R. 702, reversed
156 B.R. 303. Bankruptcy ^S**™'

2611

12. Service
Failure to serve general partner who was jointly, rather than jointly and
severally, liable on debt precluded renewal of judgment against him, but did not
affect renewal of judgment against two general partners who were served.
U.C.A.1953, 48-1-12. Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 1990, 800 P.2d 795. Judgment
^•^

868(2);

Partnership ^ - ^

375

13. Laches
Defense of laches is primarily addressed in trial court. Bergeson v. Life
Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct.
1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545.

Equity ^ ^

84

14. Dismissal
A judgment of dismissal pursuant to a stipulated settlement is ordinarily a
judgment on the merits barring another action for the same cause. Bergeson v. Life
Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct.
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1452,

360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545.

Judgment X ^ ~ ~

570(6)

Where Utah court on stipulation entered judgment dismissing action brought by
director against the company to recover unpaid director's fees and judgment stated
that action together with any possible counterclaims relating thereto was dismissed
with prejudice, such judgment was res judicata in subsequent stockholder's
derivative suit wherein it was alleged that director and others in violation of
their fiduciary duty as corporate officers and directors issued company stock
without consideration even though judgment was entered without approval of
stockholders, in view of fact that state court had jurisdiction of parties and of
subject matter and had power to enter judgment, and claim of lack of corporate
power, in absence of stockholder action, should have been addressed to Utah court
and at most it was a collateral attack on judgment and could not be made in federal
court. Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227,
certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545.
828.9(5)

Judgment

^ ^

15. Parol evidence
Parol evidence rule rendered inadmissible, in action to collect on note signed by
general partner for limited partnership, allegations concerning alleged prior oral
agreement providing that general partner would not be personally liable on the
note; loan documents were clear on their face and contained no provision stating
that general partner would not be personally liable on the note. U.C.A.1953, 48-112, 48-2-9. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Felger, 1987, 658 F.Supp. 175.
Evidence

c^>
^^

459(2)

16. Evidence of joint ventures
Real estate agent's receipt of $2,000 from general contractor was a share of the
profits and was prima facie evidence that he was a joint venturer; owners
testified that agent told them he was general contractor's partner, had met with
them and general contractor several times and had gone beyond normally expected
real estate agent activities by assisting with ordering of materials for job site.
U.C.A.1953, 48-1-3.1, 48-1-10 to 48-1-12. Hoth v. White, 1990, 799 P.2d 213.
Joint Adventures ^ • ^

1.1!

17. Sufficiency of evidence
In suit by operator of tavern business against owner of equipment, furnishings and
inventory of such business to recover one-half of $10,000 sum paid by city
redevelopment agency as compensation for disruption of the business on theory that
operator and owner were engaged in a partnership, evidence warranted findings that
value of the going concern and goodwill belonged to the parties as partners in the
enterprise, that the $10,000 sum paid by agency was compensation for loss due to
forced relocation of business and thus that parties were entitled to equal shares
of such sum. U.C.A.1953, 11-19-23.3 et seq., 48-1-1 et seq., 48-1-4, 48-1-12, 48-
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1-15 (1) , 48-1-37, 57-12-1 et seq.
Partnership ^ - ^ ^

53;

Cutler v. Bowen, 1975, 543 P.2d 1349.

Partnership X ^ ^ w w

336(3)

18. Award
Compensation award against partnership held unauthorized, where claim was made
against individual partner only, without notice to or appearance by other partners.
Comp.Laws 1917, §§ 6510, 6511, 6520; Laws 1921, c. 89, §§ 13-15; Comp.Laws 1917, §
3110, as amended by Laws 1919, c. 63. Palle v. Industrial Commission, 1932, 79
Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222.

Workers' Compensation >*•-

1771

Compensation award against partnership on claim against individual partner, without
indication in pleadings demand was against him as partner, held invalid as to
individual partner. Comp.Laws 1917, § 3110, as amended by Laws 1919, c. 63. Palle
v. Industrial Commission, 1932, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222. Workers'
Compensation

€=>„
^-^

1776

Compensation claim for injuries held not within statute rendering partnership
members jointly and severally liable, but within statute imposing joint liability,
so as to make award against partnership on claim against individual partner
invalid. Laws 1921, c. 89, §§ 13-15; Comp.Laws 1917, § 3110, as amended by Laws
1919, c. 63. Palle v. Industrial Commission, 1932, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 81
A.L.R. 1222,

Workers' Compensatiion ^ ^

177*

19. Interest
Where members of partnership and directors of corporation were jointly and
severally liable for difference between value of shares of stock issued to
partnership and sum which represented cash plus value of furniture and equipment
furnished, interest would be allowed and computed on basis that stock for which
there was failure of consideration was last stock issued to partnership. Bergeson
v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 7_9

€=>

S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Interest ^ - ^

21

U.C.A. 1953 § 48-1-12, UT ST § 48-1-12
Current through 2007 First Special Session including laws passed at the
2007 November General election.
Copr © 2007 Thomson/West
END OF DOCUMENT
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Part III.

Pleadings, Motions, and Orders

RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, I f the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action h as not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 2 0 days after it is served,
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time
remaining for response to the original pleading o>r within 10 days after service of
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court
otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not r aised by the pleading
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Su ch amendments of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time , even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the tri al of these issues.
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadin gs to be amended when
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserve d thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence.
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleading.

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even
though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or
defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the
supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Limitation of Actions ^ " ^
Parties ^ " ^ " ^

54<r

127, 124.

62 m

ling ^ *
229 to 273, 427.
Pleadd
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 302k229 to 302k273;
287k54; 287k62.
C.J.S. Architects § 39.
C.J.S. Damages § 223.

302k427;

241kl27;

241kl24;

C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §§ 228 to 231, 235.
C.J.S. Parties §§ 76 to 7_8, _8£, 1_£8 to 153.
C.J.S. Pleading §§ 323 to £75, 8_22^, _82_4, 858.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
59 A.L.R. 2nd 169, Amendment of Pleadings to Assert Statute of Limitations.
Forms
Am. Jur. PI. St Pr. Forms Pleading § 225, Procedural Rules References.
Am. Jur. Pi. & Pr. Forms Pleading § 284, Procedural Rules References.
Am. Jur. Pi. & Pr. Forms Depositions and Discovery § 3, Procedural Rules
References.
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
Amended and supplemental pleadings, see FRCP Rule 15.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Amendment of pleadings,
Amendment of pleadings to add party, simultaneous amendment of judgment
imposing liability against party, due process, right to notice and hearing,
see Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., U.S.Ohio2000, 120 S.Ct. 1579, 529 U.S. 460.
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Part VII.

Judgment

RULE 54. JUDGMENTS;

COSTS

(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any
order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's
initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a judgment shall not
include any matter by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order
or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other
form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(c)(1) Generally.
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants;
and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights
of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
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(c)(2) Judgment
by default.
A judgment by default shall not be different in kind
from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(d)(1) To whom awarded.
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than
costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide
the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its
officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(d)(2) How assessed.
The party who claims h i s costs must within five days after
the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed,
a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the
action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have
been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with
the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served
and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment.
The clerk must include in
any judgment signed by him any interest on t h e verdict or decision from the time it
was rendered, and the costs, if the same h a v e been taxed or ascertained.
The clerk
must, within two days after the costs
have b e e n taxed or ascertained, in any case
where not included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register
of actions and in the judgment docket.
[Amended effective January 1, 1985;

November 1, 2003.]

CROSS REFERENCES
Arbitration in third party motor vehicle accident cases, costs set forth in
this rule, see § 31A-22-321.
Final or interlocutory appeals, see Rules App. P r o c , Rule 5.
Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, arbitration, see §§ 31A-22-305
and 31A-22-305.3.
Verified memorandum of costs,

see Rules Civ. P r o c , Form 23.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
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Part VI.

Trials

RULE 52. FINDINGS BY THE COURT
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the fac ts specially and stare separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment sh all be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in
granting or refusing interlocutory injuncti ons the court shall similarly set forth
the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its
action. Requests for findings are not nece ssary for purposes of review. Findings
of fact, whether based on oral or documenta ry evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard sh all be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master,
to the extent that the court adopts them, s hall be considered as the findings of
the court. It will be sufficient if the fi ndings of fact and conclusions of law
are stated orally and recorded in open cour t following the close of the evidence or
appear in an opinion or memorandum of decis ion filed by the court. The trial court
need not enter findings of fact and conclus ions of law in rulings on motions,
except as provided in Rule 41 (b) . The cour t shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12 (b),
50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion i s based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has
made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Except in actions for
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an
issue of fact:
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(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered m

the minutes.

[Amended effective January 1, 1987.]
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Injunction

^-^

it ^ - ^
Judgment
Trial
^
il ^^"^

152, 156.
200.

" :388, 393 to 400, 405.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 388k388;
388k393 to 388k400; 388k405; 228k200;
212kl52;
212kl56.
C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 219 to 231, 24Q.
C.J.S. Judgments § 49.
C.J.S. Trial §§ 1073 to 1082, 1085 to 1086, 1093 to 1118, 1135 to 1138.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Forms
Am. Jur. PI. & Pr. Forms Trial § 491, Procedural Rules References.
NOTES OF DECISIONS

I.

I.

IN GENERAL

1-70

II.

REVIEW 71-140

IN GENERAL

<Subdivision

Index>

Actions and proceedings where necessary, duty to make findings £
Additional findings 37
Administrative adjudications 2_
Amendment or correction of findings or conclusions 3_5
Conclusions of law £
Conclusiveness and effect, construction and operation 43
Conformity to pleadings, issues and proofs 20-26
Conformity to pleadings, issues and proofs - In general 20
Conformity to pleadings, issues and proofs - Evidence improperly
24
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NOTICE OF FILING COMPLETED TRANSCRIPT
To:
Clerk of the Court of Appeals
Date: Januaiy 30, 2007
Re:
Appellate Court # 20070029 -SC
Trial Case No. 060900323
Williams v. Stags Car Club
Notice is hereby given that the following transcript will be mailed for filing with the Second
District Court in Ogden, Utah January 31, 2007:
Motion to Dismiss November 1, 2006,

Sincerely,

Carolyriferickson, CSR
801-5234186
cc:
Jacque M. Ramos
Moriarity Budaruddin & Booke
(In transcript)
Lauri Shingle
Managing Court Reporter
(In Transcript)

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SHARON WILLIAMS, et aL,

Case No. 060900323 PI

Plaintiff,

Appellate Case No. 20070029-SC

STAGS CAR CLUB, et aL,
Defendant

With Keyword Index

MOTION TO DISMISS NOVEMBER 1, 2006
BEFORE
HONORABLE ERNEST W. JONES

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186
, \*j>

\

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

JACQUE M. RAMOS
Attorney at Law

For the Defendants:

DAVID M. CONNORS
MELINDA MORGAN
MICHAEL K. WOOLLEY
CLIFFORD J. PAYNE
DAVTD R. HAMILTON
MARK R. ANDERSON
GARYL.DOEHLING
DANIEL McConkie
Attorneys at Law
INDEX

ORAL ARGUMENT
Ms. Morgan
Mr. Woolley
Mr. Connor
Ms. Ramos
RULING

p«age

3, 27
8
,30, 32
11, 31
33

1

reasonable inferences for those under Utah rules allow the

2

Motion to Dismiss to be denied.

3

Dismiss and joinders thereof should be denied because

4

plaintiffs have properly alleged two theories of liability;

5

one, vicarious liability of a for profit joint venture or

6

partnership qualifications under the law that does hold other

7

members of that partnership vicariously liable for the

8

tortuous acts of another member while acting within the scope

9

of that partnership.

10

Defendant's Motion to

And number two, that their individual participation

11

in managing and overseeing that event is sufficient enough

12

for an allegation to hold those members directly liable for

13

those acts or failure to act in assuming the duty under rhe

14

law to maintain a reasonable safe premises of rhose events.

15

In the worst case scenario today in which that

16

plaintiff's allegations are unambiguously certain to be

17

interpreted to include that individual participation among

18

the members, the plaintiffs in the alternative request the

19

Court to grant leave to amend to make those allegations

20

certain and clear.

21

That's all I have.

22

THE COURT:

23

Ms. Morgan, any response?

24

MS. MORGAN:

25

to be clear.

Thank you Your Honor.

All right, thank you Ms. Ramos.

Just a few.

First of all I just want

There as a lot of discussion about discovery
27

1

enterprise which is where Mr. Ramos would like to go.

2

allegation is not contained in the complaint, Your Honor.

3

Nor is there any allegation in the complaint to bolster what

4

Ms. Morgan has already said and Mr. Woolley.

5

any allegation in the complaint that any individual other

6

than Mr. Wiggins or that the club, acting somehow m

7

collective capacity, instructed Mr. Wiggins to get into his

8

car and move it that day when the unfortunate accident

9

occurred.

Nor is there

a

The absence of that allegation, Your Honor, there

10

is no basis to impose individual liability on any one

11

individual member of the club.

12

THE COURT;

13

That

All right.

Anybody else, do I dare

ask?

14

Again, I appreciate the arguments from all the

15

parties and I appreciate all the briefs and memorandums but

16

Mr. Ramos, I admire what you're trying to do but I just don't

17

think I can let this fly.

18

Dismiss as to all of the defendants except, of course, Mr.

19

Wiggins.

20

was really actively involved in committing this tort which is

21

backing over or running over your client is Mr. Wiggins and I

22

just think it's too much of a stretch to try to impose any

23

kind of liability against all of the members of the Stags Car

24

Club - it's almost a tongue twister to say.

25 J

I'm going to grant the Motion to

It just seems the bottom line, the only person who

I don't know if I need to make specific findings
33

1

but it seems to me from reading the briefs, it appears to me

2

that the Skags Car Club is an unincorporated nonprofit social

3

club and that's what I got out of reading the briefs and it

4

also appears to me that all of the defendants are individual

5

car members or the car club and it seems the law is very

6

clear that individual club members of an unincorporated,

7

nonprofit social club cannot be held liable for the

8

negligence of a club member, Mr. Wiggins, simply by virtue of

9

their status as members of the club.

10

Again, I just don't see that there's any duty here

11

by the members of the car club to supervise or keep a

12

lookout.

13

plaintiff in this case, Ms. Williams was a licensee, she's

14

not an invitee.

15

seems to me that her category would be one of a licensee

16

rather than an invitee.

17

defendants, these car club members were ever acting in

18

furtherance of the tort.

19

was acting for pecuniary gain in this particular case based

20

on what I saw in the briefs.

21

dangerous condition that existed and probably most important

22

I don't find that the defendants were the possessors of the

23

land even if there was a dangerous condition.

24

simply renting that property out to hold a steak fry.

25

It seems to me from looking at the briefs that the

She wasn't there for a business deal so it

I just don't find that the

There's just no indication the club

Again, I don't find there's any

They were

So anyway, based on that, I'm going to grant the
34

1

motion.

I just thought this case, this Orser vs. George was

2

right on point.

3

talked about that same premise but it just seemed to me that

4

case just kind of jumped out at me and again, it's not enough

5

I don't think to say, well, these people all belong to the

6

car club, they were all actively involved in the steak fry,

7

therefore there's liability.

8

somehow they have to be actively involved in the tort itself.

9

They have to be doing something that led to the injury to Ms.

There were a number of other cases that also

I think it has to focus on

10

Williams and just belonging to the car club and just paying

11

dues and just bringing your steak or potluck or whatever, I

12

just don't think that's enough to impose any kind of

13

liability but I do Ms- Ramos, I do admire what you were

14

trying to do.

15

liability and I don't blame you for pursuing that but anyway,

16

I'll grant the motion.

17
18

There's always a new theory out there on

Does somebody want to prepare an order based on
what I've just said?

Ms, Morgan.

19

MS. MORGAN:

20

MS. RAMOS:

I have one clarification just to ask

22

THE COURT:

All right.

23

MS. RAMOS:

In the fact that the decision to grant

21

I will, Your Honor.

you.

24

the Motion to Dismiss was (inaudible) and your findings to

25

the Stag Car Club itself in that and they're still, this
35
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RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants Jim BurkdoU, Devin Ellis,
Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page,
Don Palfi'iyman, and Jim Vowles
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P 0 Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Uti

SiUyf!

IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SHARON WILLIAMS and
LYNN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

1

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS
AND
FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
RULE 54(b)

STAGS CAR CLUB, et al.,
Civil No. 060900323
Defendants.
Judge Emest W. Jones

Defendants Jim BurkdoU, Devm Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page,
Don Palireyman, and Jim Vowles' Motion to Dismiss, which was joined by all defendants who
are club members, except Ralph Wiggins, came on for hearing before The Honorable Ernest W.
Jones on November 1, 2006, at 10:30 a.m. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, Jacque
M. Ramos of MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE; defendants Jim BurkdoU, Devin Ellis,
Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, and Jim Vowles were represented

by their counsel, Melinda A. Morgan of RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON;
defendants Greg Warg and BJ. Burkdoll were represented by their counsel Michael K. Woolley
of RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON; defendant Ralph S. Wiggins was represented
by his counsel Clifford J. Payne of NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE; defendant
Brent G. Bodily was represented by his counsel Mark R. Anderson of WILLIAMS & HUNT;
defendant Mack White was represented by his counsel Daniel S. McConkie of KIRTON &
MCCONKIE; defendants Stags Car Club, Adam Christofferson, Craig Christofferson, Jack
Harris, Bruno Perry, and John Elwess represented by their counsel David M. Connors of
CHAPMAN & CUTLER; defendant Brent Keyes was represented by his counsel Gary L.
Doehling of DOEHLING & DRISCOLL; and, defendants Dennis Bench, Robert Eames, Mickey
Ellis, Jerry Fulmer, Dale Hammon, Mike Howell, Dave Squires, Bruce Woolsey, Ryan Woolsey,
Bill New, and Scott New were represented by their counsel David R. Hamilton of DAVID R.
HAMILTON, P.C.
The court, having reviewed the pleadings in this matter, having heard oral
argument thereon, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following
ruling.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that:
1) in their Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, plaintiffs fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted against all defendants who are club members, except Ralph
Wiggins, since they fail to plead that these members acted in furtherance of the tort which
harmed plaintiff;
2

2) the above-entitled action be, and the same is hereby, dismissed with prejudice
against all defendants who are club members, except Ralph Wiggins;
3) this Order of Dismissal serves as a Final Judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to all defendants who are club members, except Ralph
Wiggins, since there is in jint i vison for delay, arid thi court hereby expressly directs that an
entry of Final Judgment be entered for these defendants; and,
4) two defendants still amain m this case. Ralph Wiggins and Stags Car Club
DATED this 3 ^ day of

/*V^E Y^

. 2006.

BY THE CoURl

District Judge

APPROVED AS 1 U I (>RM
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN, & BOOKE

JACQUE M. RAMOS
Attorneys for Plaintiff

3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
was hand-delivered on this / ^ d a y of November, 2006, to the following:
Bradley L. Booke
Jacque M. Ramos
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN
& BOOKE, LLC
341 South Main Street, Suite 406
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Gary L. Johnson
Michael K. Woolley
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
50 S. Main Street, #700
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
Attorneys for Greg Warg and BJ Burkdoll

and that it was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this same day, to the following:
David R. Hamilton
DAVID R. HAMILTON, P.C.
3434 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202
Ogden,UT 84401
Attorneys for Dennis Bench, Robert Fames,
Mickey Elks, Jerry Fulmer, Dale Hammon,
Mike Howell, Dave Squires, Bruce
Woolsey, Ryan Woolsey, Bill New, and
Scott New

David M. Connors
James K. Tracy
Jennifer A. Brown
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP
201 South Main Street, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Stags Car Club, Adam
Christofferson, Craig Christofferson, Jack
Harris, Bruno Perry, and John Elwess

4

Kiimen L. Taylor
HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, LLC
2484 West 7200 North
P. 0. Box 91
Honeyville, UT 84314
Attorneys for Jimmxe Germer

Daniel S. McConkie
KTRTON & McCONKTE
60 E. South Temple. #1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
Attorneys for Mack White

Clifford J. Payne
NELSON CHIPMAN QUIGLEY & PAYNE
215 S. State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Ralph S Wiggms

Gary L. Doehling
DOEHLTNG & DRISCOLL. P.C.
628 Rood Avenue. Suite 3
Grand Junction, CO 81501
Attorneys for Brent Keyes

Carolyn Stevens Jensen
Mark R. Anderson
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Attorneys for Brent G Bodily
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